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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM AVERETT and MARIE 
A. AVERETT. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
UTAH COUNTY DRAINAGE DISTRICT 
NO. 1, a corporation 
Defendant-Respondent 
INTERMOUNTAIN POWER AGENCY. 
Intervenor. 
C£se No. 86-0133 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs-appellants, William and Marie A. Averett 
(hereinafter "Averetts"). brought an action to quiet title by 
adverse possession of approximately two acres of real property 
west of Springville. Utah County, against the claim of defen-
dant-respondent. Utah County Drainage District No. 1 (herein-
after "Drainage District"). Drainage District counterclaimed 
against Averetts seeking to quiet title to the same two acres 
by virtue of its Warranty Deed. After a trial to the Court, 
the Honorable George E. Ballif. District Judge of the Fourth 
Judicial District. dismissed the Averetts1 complaint for 
adverse possession, and quieted title to the said real pro-
perty in the Drainage District and awarded the Drainage Dis-
trict all funds tendered to the Court by the intervenor. 
Intermountain Power Agency (hereinafter "IPA"). Averetts 
thereafter appealed from the judgment of the Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Drainage District was organized on November 4. 1918 
as a drainage district under a statutory predecessor to Title 
19. Utah Code Annotated (Finding of Fact No. 1. R. 213). 
During the years of 1919 through 1920. Drainage District 
commenced and completed construction of an open drainage ditch 
which included the open drain on the property which is the 
subject of this action (hereinafter "subject property") (Find-
ing of Fact No. 2. R. 213). Since that time, the Drainage 
District has owned, used and maintained the open drainage 
ditch on the subject property (Finding of Fact No. 11. R. 215). 
It is unclear from the evidence whether the Drainage 
District constructed the ditch on the subject property under a 
statutory right of entry or with the consent and permission of 
the then property owner (R. 455. 474-476. 495). However, the 
Court found that there was no evidence of the grant of an 
easement to Drainage District nor the establishment by the 
Drainage District of a prescriptive easement on the subject 
property prior to 1934 when it received its deed from the 
Packards (Finding of Fact No. 6. R. 214). 
On the 31st day of July. 1934. Chillian F. and Phoebe 
S. Packard executed a deed to Drainage District which deed was 
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recorded April 3. 1935 as Entry No. 3091. Book 316. Page 50 of 
the records of the Utah County Recorder. Said deed recited a 
consideration of $100.00 and conveyed to the Drainage Dis-
trict, among other parcels, the property which is the subject 
matter of this action (Findings of Fact Nos. 3 and 4. R. 213. 
Defendant's Ex. 17). On the 30th day of April. 1968. Joseph 
C. Williamson and Nada R. Williamson conveyed a certain parcel 
of real property to plaintiff. Marie A. Averett. which deed 
was recorded May 1. 1968. Although the description contained 
in the deed included the subject property, the deed also 
contained the following exclusion: 
Less that portion of the above described 
property sold to Utah County Drainage 
District No. 1. a corporation by Warranty 
Deed dated July 31. 1934 executed by 
Chillian F. Packard and Phoebe S. Packard, 
his wife, recorded April 3. 1935 as Entry 
No. 3091. Book 316. Page 50 records of Utah 
County. Utah. 
(Findings of Fact Nos. 7 and 8. R. 214). 
The property retained by Averetts until condemnation 
by IPA was an approximately square parcel. The property 
described in the deed from the Packards to the Drainage Dis-
trict was a 66 foot wide strip which, in the vicinity of the 
Averett property, runs in an inverted L shape generally, on 
the East and the North of the Averett property (Exhibits 11 
and 17). The open drainage ditch is located on part of this 
66 foot wide strip. It was constructed by the use of a drag-
line with the ditch material being dumped on either side of 
-3-
the ditch to form a hump or berm (R. 484). An illustrative 
cross-section of the ditch is contained in Exhibit 12. This 
shows a channel of water which rises to a bank and then on up 
from the bank to the top of the crest or berm. The testimony 
varied as to the width of the channel of water at the bottom 
of the ditch from four to five feet up to ten feet (R. 330. 
482). Near the top of the ditch, the width ranged from 20 to 
30 feet (R. 485, 503). There was also an additional distance 
on each side of the ditch from the edge of the bank to the top 
of the berm which would be from five to eight feet (R. 374). 
The depth of the ditch was from eight to ten feet (R. 373). 
When Averetts purchased their property, there were 
fences already located on the property (R. 303). The subject 
property was included within those fences (Exhibit 11). Mr. 
Averett asserted, inconsistently with his prior deposition, 
that he had constructed a portion of the fence on the North 
(R. 353, 357-358). However, the Court found that the fence on 
the East of the subject property had been constructed by the 
railroad and the fence on the North of the subject property 
had been constructed by a Mr. Forbush (Finding of Fact No. 21, 
R.216). 
There was conflicting evidence as to whether or not 
these two fences were maintained by Averetts and the adequacy 
of any such maintenance (R. 322, 324, 328, 357. 491, 492, 524, 
526. 528-529, 533, 537, 544). The Court found that the 
Averetts did not adequately maintain the fence on the East of 
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the subject property nor the fence on the North of the subject 
property to the extent that animals were adequately confined 
or retained within the fences and, as such# they were not a 
substantial inclosure of the subject property (Finding of Fact 
No. 22. R. 16). 
Following Averetts1 acquisition of their property, 
they built a corral in the Southeast corner of the above 
described fence and connected to the railroad fence on the 
East, and another fence on the South. Within this corral, 
Averett also had a corn silage pit built on the edge of the 
drainage ditch, and also built a loading chute and shed. Both 
the corral and the silage pit contained within it were located 
partially on the subject property (R. 316-317, 321. 363). The 
evidence was inconclusive and conflicting as to the size of 
the silage pit and corral and the extent to which they were on 
the subject property (R. 319, 321, 527, 532, 543). The Court 
found that although the corral was a substantial inclosure and 
the silage pit within it was an improvement to the property 
contained in the corral, Averetts had failed to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence the extent to which they en-
closed the subject Drainage District property (Findings of 
Fact Nos. 19 and 20, R. 216). 
Although Averetts1 claim is based upon adverse pos-
session of the subject property (R. 2) and their brief asserts 
that they indicated their ownership, there is almost no evi-
dence of the adverse nature of their possession of the pro-
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perty. Averetts never disputed the use of the drainage ditch 
and never prevented access to or use of the ditch by the 
agent6 of the Drainage District (R. 321, 489). The agents of 
the Drainage District likewise never asked permission to enter 
the property (R. 489). The only testimony of Averetts1 ex-
clusive possession of the property was the posting of certain 
no trespassing or hunting by permission signs and a request 
that one individual leave the premises (R. 336-337). When 
asked about keeping others off the property, Mr. Averett 
answered as follows: 
Q: During your occupancy of the property 
from 1968 until 1983, or late '83, did you 
keep others off the property near the drain 
ditch area? 
A: No sir, I did not. 
(R. 336:19-22) 
Based upon the evidence presented, the Court found 
that: 
24. Any possession of the subject property 
by the plaintiffs was not exclusive in that 
other persons, including particularly the 
agents and employees of the defendant made 
use of the subject property. Further, any 
possession of the subject property by 
plaintiffs was not of sufficiently open, 
notorious, hostile and adverse nature as to 
bring such possession to the knowledge of 
the agents and employees of defendant. 
(Finding of Fact No. 24. R. 217) 
This finding of the Court is consistent with its 
finding that neither the Averetts nor the surviving agents and 
employees of the Drainage District had actual knowledge of the 
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Drainage District's ownership of the subject property until 
the IPA offered to purchase the property (Finding of Fact Nos. 
9 and 10, R. 214-215, 308, 322-324, 479-485, 512, 528, 529, 
533). Averetts did have constructive notice, both by the deed 
to their property and the recording statute, of the Drainage 
District's ownership of the subject property (Finding of Fact 
Nos. 8 and 9, R. 214). The recitation of $100.00 considera-
I 
tion in the 1934 deed to the Drainage District as well as the 
language contained in the exclusion from both the Averetts* 
warranty deed and the warranty deed of their predecessor, 
which described the property as having been "sold" to the 
Drainage District, are evidence that prior officers and agents 
may have known of said ownership (Exhibits 2, 16, 17; Finding 
of Fact No. 10; R. 215, 428-430). 
Although other areas of the ditch had required the 
use of machinery such as a dragline to clean the ditch, since 
the Averetts1 acquisition of their property, the maintenance 
of the ditch in the area of the Averetts* property had prin-
cipally consisted of the removal, by shove J., of watercress and 
debris from the ditch (R. 457-459, 477-478, 487). However, on 
two or three occasions Arthur Boyer, a prior president of the 
Drainage District, hauled in loads of rocks to build up the 
ditch banks (R. 481, 521), and had to put hard pan on the 
North side of the ditch to build that up as well (R. 
486-487). Raphel Palfreyman, president of the Drainage Dis-
trict in 1983 and at the time of trial, indicated that a 
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backhoe had not been used in the ditch near Averetts1 property 
although it should have been done because the Drainage Dis-
trict did not have sufficient money. He further indicated 
that had not IPA acquired the property, it would have been 
necessary to use either a baclchoe or dragline to clean the 
ditch (R. 522-523). The Court found, due to the size and 
width of the ditch and its needs for maintenance, that the 
entire subject property was reasonably necessary for the use 
and maintenance of the open drainage ditch (Finding of Fact 
No. 13, R. 215). 
Until the acquisition of the subject property by the 
IPA. the Drainage District intended to continue using the 
ditch to drain water from the properties contained within the 
district and to clean and otherwise maintain the drainage 
ditches, including the ditch on the subject property (R. 
468). The Drainage District had never offered to sell the 
property to anyone (R. 523). The Court found that the Drain-
age District had not intended to abandon, nor had it aban-
doned, any of the subject property and it has not sold nor 
intended to sell any of the subject property prior to the time 
IPA sought condemnation of the subject property (Findings of 
Fact No. 12. R. 215). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Drainage District is a municipal corporation which 
owns, uses and maintains a drainage system including an open 
drain on the subject property. Under the provisions of 
§19-4-4. the use of its ditch constitutes a public use and is 
for a public benefit. Under the provisions of §78-12-13, Utah 
Code Annotated, as amended, neither Averetts nor any other 
person may adversely possess property which is held for a 
public use. 
The case of Pioneer Investment & Trust Company v. 
Board of Education of Salt Lake City. 35 Utah 1. 99 P. 150 
(1909). states that property which is not held for a public 
use may be adversely possessed. It found that school property 
which had been abandoned for ten to fifteen years for school 
purposes and was offered for sale was not held for a public 
use. Van Wagoner v. Whitmore. 58 Utah 418. 199 P. 670 (1921). 
identified the abandonment of the school purpose and the 
intention to sell the property were significant factors. The 
trial court found that the Drainage District had not abandoned 
or intended to abandon the public use of the subject property, 
nor had it ever sold or intended to sell the subject pro-
perty. The most that can be said is that the officers and 
agents of the Drainage District had no actual knowledge of 
ownership. 
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The trial court further found that the entire subject 
property was reasonably necessary for the use and maintenance 
of the drainage ditch. No cases have been cited which permit 
the adverse possession of property in excess of the amount 
reasonably necessary for the public use and purpose of the 
Drainage District. By comparison, the cases of Commercial 
Waterway Dist. v. Permanente Cement Co., 379 P.2d 178 (Hash. 
1963). and Martin v. City of Stockton. 39 Cal.App.552. 179 P. 
894 (1919), held that one could not adversely possess a por-
tion within a defined waterway even though it was not part of 
the main channel. 
If the Court determines that some or all of the 
subject property was not public property held for public use. 
Averetts are still not entitled to adversely possess the 
subject property. The trial court found that Averetts had 
failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence their 
adverse possession of the subject property as against the 
claim of the Drainage District. The case of Bennion v. 
Hansen, 699 P.2d 757 (Utah. 1985). provides that the findings 
of the trial court will not be disturbed, when all the evi-
dence is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial 
court's decision, unless there is no substantial evidence to 
support such findings. Scharf v. BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068. 
1070 (Utah. 1985) requires the appellant "to marshal all the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then 
demonstrate that even viewing it in the light raost favorable 
-10-
to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support 
the finding." Averetts have failed to meet the requirements 
set by these cases. 
Scott v. Hansen. 18 Utah 2d 303. 422 P.2d 525 (1966). 
requires that the adverse claimant's possession be sufficient 
to reasonably notify the owner of the adverse claim to the 
property. Because Averetts did not construct the fences on 
the North and East and because of their failure to adequately 
maintain the fences or to prevent or restrict the access of 
the agents of the Drainage District or other persons to the 
subject property, the possession of Averetts was not suffi-
cient to notify the Drainage District of their adverse claim. 
It likewise was not sufficiently exclusive or continuous to 
satisfy the requirements of adverse possession. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AVERETTS CANNOT ADVERSELY POSSESS THE PROPERTY OF THE 
DRAINAGE DISTRICT BECAUSE IT WAS HELD FOR PUBLIC USE 
AND HAD NOT BEEN ABANDONED 
The Drainage District was organized on November 4. 
1918 under a statutory predecessor to Title 19. Utah Code 
Annotated and has existed since that day (Finding of Fact No. 
1. R. 213). The Utah Supreme Court has had two occasions to 
determine what a drainage district is. In the case of Elkins 
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307 (1930) at page 318, the Court stated: "A drainage dis-
trict is one form of municipal corporation." The Court also 
stated in State by and through State Land Board v. Blake, 88 
Utah 584, 20 P-2d 871 (1933), at page 875-876: 
The adjudicated cases are all to the effect 
that a drainage district such as that 
involved in this litigation is impressed 
with a public interest. Some courts speak 
of them as municipal corporations, others 
as quasi municipal corporations, others as 
public or quasi public corporations, and 
still others as governmental agencies of 
this state. . . . It is sufficient to the 
purposes of this case to observe the drain-
age districts under our laws are granted 
governmental functions. (Emphasis added) 
Consistent with these cases, the lower court held 
that the Drainage District was a municipal corporation (Find-
ing of Fact No. 1, R. 212). 
It is well established that the property of municipal 
corporations which is held for a public use cannot be acquired 
by adverse possession. This general rule is stated in 3 
Am.Jur.2d, Adverse Possession §206, as follows: 
As a general rule, property held by munici-
pal and quasi municipal corporations cannot 
be acquired by adverse possession at least 
insofar as the property is held by the 
public and this is true even though the 
property has not been irrevocably dedicated 
to public use. This rule has been applied 
to the property of municipal corporations 
proper, counties, towns or townships, 
irrigation districts and school districts. 
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This general rule has been specifically adopted by 
Utah in §78-12-13. Utah Code Annotated, as amended, which 
precludes the adverse possession of property held for public 
use: 
No person shall be allowed to acquire any 
right or title in or to any lands held by 
any town, city or county, or the corporate 
authorities thereof, designated for public 
use as streets. lanes, avenues, alleys, 
parks or public squares, or for any other 
public purpose. by adverse possession 
thereof for any length of time whatsoever. 
In the case of Pioneer Investment & Trust Company v. 
Board of Education of Salt Lake City. 35 Utah 1. 99 P. 150 
(1909). the Court had before it the issue as to whether or not 
property of the Board of Education of Salt Lake City which had 
not been used as a school for 10 to 15 years and which had 
been offered for sale, could be adversely possessed. The 
Supreme Court in Pioneer reiterated the principle that pro-
perty which is held in a governmental capacity or for a public 
purpose is not susceptible to adverse possession but that 
property which is held in a capacity other than a governmental 
one is susceptible to adverse possession. The Court noted 
that the property in question was not and had not been used 
for public school purposes for 10 or 15 years, that the Board 
of Education had abandoned its use for that purpose and that 
the properties had been held for sale as business property. 
Based upon this evidence, the Court found that even though the 
property had at one time been held for a public use. it had 
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ceased to be public property and could be adversely possessed. 
Following Pioneer. the Court in Van Wagoner v. 
Whitmore. 58 Utah 418. 199 P. 670 (1921). refused to permit 
the adverse possession of state school lands. One of the 
major differences noted by the Van Wagoner Court was the fact 
that in Pioneer the public use had been abandoned for a long 
period of time and the property had been held for non-public 
purposes, namely sale. 
The Court in Gibbons v. Salt Lake City Corporation, 6 
U.2d 219. 310 P.2d 513 (1957). dealt with the issue of what 
was required under the provisions of §78-12-13 to "hold" 
property for public use. The Court there stated at page 225: 
"In order for the city to hold property under the above 
statute, it must have some semblance of title, possession or 
the right to the use thereof." Further, in the case of City 
of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando. 537 P.2d 1250 (Cal. 
1975). the California court stated that the particular public 
use for which property is held is immaterial as long as it is 
held for public use. 
There can be no adverse holding of such 
land [meaning land held for public use] 
which will deprive the public of the right 
thereto. or give title to the adverse 
claimant, or create a title by virtue of 
the statute of limitations. The rule is 
universal in its application to all pro-
perty set apart or reserved for public use, 
and the public use for which it is appro-
priated is immaterial. (Emphasis added) 
Id. at 1306. 
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Consistent with these principles, the Utah Legisla-
ture, by enacting §19-4-4, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, 
stated that "the use of any canal, ditch or the like created 
under the provisions of this act, shall be deemed a public use 
and for a public benefit." 
In the instant case, the Drainage District received a 
deed from Chillian F. and Phoebe S. Packard dated the 31st of 
July,. 1934 which was recorded April 3, 1935 (Finding of Fact 
No. 3, R. 213). Since that time, until condemnation by IPA, 
it has had title to all of the subject property. Since the 
completion of the open drainage ditch in 1920, the Drainage 
District has owned, used and maintained the open drainage 
ditch on the subject property (Finding of Fact No. 11, R. 
215). Such use. by virtue of §19-4-4. Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended, is a public use and for a public benefit. 
As indicated in the case of Pioneer Investment, 
property can be changed from a governmental capacity or public 
use to a proprietary capacity by virtue of an abandonment of 
the public use and an intention to sell the property. The 
Court in Van Wagoner noted both this long abandonment and 
intention to sell as crucial elements as to why adverse pos-
session was permitted in the Pioneer case. Contrary to these 
factors important to both the Pioneer and Van Wagoner cases, 
the district court found that Drainage District had neither 
abandoned, intended to abandon, sold nor intended to sell any 
of the subject property (Finding of Fact No. 12, R. 215). 
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The most that can be said is that the surviving 
agents and officers of the Drainage District did not have 
actual knowledge of the Drainage District's titled ownership 
of the subject property (Finding of Fact No. 10. R. 215). 
Averetts attempt to rely upon this lack of actual knowledge as 
evidence of an abandonment. This is contrary to the concept 
of abandonment set forth in Black's Law Dictionary. 4th Ed. 
There, abandonment is defined at page 9 as: "The voluntary 
relinquishment of possession of a thing by owner with inten-
tion of terminating his ownership, but without vesting it in 
any other person." See also Hammond v. Johnson. 94 Utah 20. 
66 P.2d 894 (1937). at page 899 where the Utah Court stated: 
"The controlling element in abandonment is a matter of in-
tent. In this connection, the word 'abandon1 has been held to 
mean 'to desert or forsake.'" Drainage District, which had no 
actual knowledge, cannot have the intent to abandon nor can it 
make a voluntary relinquishment. 
In support of its position that the lack of knowledge 
of ownership can permit the adverse possession of property. 
Averetts cite the case of Sisson v. Koelle. 10 Wash.App. 746. 
520 P.2d 1380 (1974). in which the Court found that Clallam 
County had "abandoned and forgotten about and had done nothing 
to sustain any title, or ownership, or control, of the land in 
question", and further went on to say that there was "nothing 
in the record indicating that the property had ever been 
devoted, reserved or set apart for use as a public right of 
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way or for any other public use." Id., at page 1383. The 
district court in the instant case did not make similar 
findings but instead found that the Drainage District had 
since 1920 made a public use of the subject property by its 
ownership, use and maintenance, of the drainage ditch on the 
subject property (Finding of Fact No. 11. R.215). 
Contrary to the apparent position of Sisson. the 
Court is cited to the case of Trigg v. Allemand. 619 P.2d 573. 
(N.M. 1980), wherein the Court indicated that public rights 
should not be lost through the inaction of its agents. 
If the land is used for the common good of 
all. that is for public use. the public is 
not to lose its right through the negli-
gence of its agents, nor because it did not 
chose to resist an encroachment by one of 
its own members, whose duty it was. as much 
as any other citizen, to protect the State 
in its right. Id. at 579 
See also City of Los Angeles, at page 1306. 
Averetts further assert that if the Court holds that 
the subject property was held for a public purpose, that it is 
more than the amount of property reasonably necessary for the 
use and maintenance of the drainage ditch. Such excess pro-
perty, it is asserted, is not reasonably necessary for the 
Drainage District's use and maintenance of the drainage ditch 
and is therefore subject to adverse possession. Averetts 
request that such matter be returned to the trial court to 
determine what part of the subject property is not reasonably 
necessary for the use and maintenance of the ditch and then to 
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quiet the same in Averetts. 
Averetts cite no case in which a court has permitted 
the adverse possession of a portion of property held by a 
municipal corporation or other governmental entity because it 
exceeds the amount reasonably necessary for its public use. 
Drainage District has likewise been unable to find any such 
case. The Court is cited to the case of Commercial Waterway 
Dist. v. Permanente Cement Co., 379 P.2d 178 (Wash. 1963). 
Although it deals with a waterway district, the case is simi-
lar in many respects to the instant case. The Commercial 
Waterway District had acquired by purchase and condemnation a 
500 foot right of way for the construction of a waterway and 
had dredged a channel into that waterway for the purpose of 
diverting the Duwamish River. Under the subsequent mainten-
ance of the United States Army Corp of Engineers, only 250 
feet of the acquired 500 foot channel was dredged. Permanente 
Cement Company sought adverse possession of property outside 
the 250 foot dredged channel on which it had constructed 
certain improvements. Permanente Cement Company claimed that 
since the property it sought to adversely possess lay outside 
the dredged channel, it was not being used as part of the 
regular water highway, the waterway district had performed no 
work on maintenance on such property, and there were no fore-
seeable plans by the district to widen the channel, this 
changed the character from public use to private. The Court 
there specifically stated that such circumstances do not 
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change the character of appellant's title which was declared 
to be for a public purpose. Id., at 180. 
The Court in Commercial Waterway District cited the 
case of Martin v. City of Stockton. 39 Cal.App.552. 179 P. 894 
(1919). which similarly held that lands within the boundaries 
of a waterway and drainage but outside the main channel could 
not be acquired by adverse possession even though the struc-
tures on the land claimed did not interfere with the use and 
purposes of the main channel. 
These cases are consistent with the policy underlying 
the protection of public property from the claims of adverse 
possession. If property is being held for a public use. it is 
for the entity administering or otherwise charged with that 
I 
public trust to decide what property is to be reasonably 
devoted to the public use. Such decision should not to be 
determined for the public by a private individual, particu-
larly one seeking to gain the property by adverse possession. 
To allow otherwise would permit an individual to assert that 
school grounds, parks, roads, etc.. are excessive and unneces-
sary and seek to adversely possess such excess. 
Not only is there no legal precedent permitting the 
adverse possession of public property not reasonably necessary 
for the public use. but the trial court has already made such 
determination at trial. The trial court found that Drainage 
District had owned, used and maintained the ditch on the 
subject property since 1920 and that the entire subject pro-
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perty was reasonably necessary for the use and maintenance of 
the Drainage Districts open drainage ditch (Finding of Fact 
Nos. 11 and 13. R. 215). 
In Bennion v. Hansen. 699 P.2d 757. 759 (Utah. 1985). 
the Court held as follows: "On appeal the findings of the 
trial court will not be disturbed unless there is no substan-
tial record evidence to support them. In reviewing the evi-
dence we view it in the light most favorable to the trial 
court." 
Finding of Fact No. 11 is supported by substantial 
evidence. There was testimony that the Drainage District had 
constructed the open drainage ditch in 1920 on the subject 
property and that as such, the district was the owner of the 
ditch (Exhibit 11. R. 453-457. 473-474). There was also 
testimony that since 1934. Drainage District had owned the 
subject property (Exhibit 17. R. 428-431). 
Finding of Fact No. 13 is also supported by substan-
tial evidence. There was testimony that the ditch was eight 
to ten feet deep with a main channel which at the bottom was 
four to ten feet in width. The top of the ditch was 20 to 30 
feet wide. There was an additional distance on each side of 
the ditch from the edge of the bank which rises to the top of 
a berm or hump. The berm then tapered off from the ditch to 
the remaining property (R. 330. 373-374. 482. 485. 503). 
While much of the maintenance for the ditch near the Averetts' 
property had not required the use of machinery, other areas 
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had required a dragline or backhoe to clean the ditch (R. 
457-459. 477-478. 487). There was testimony of the use of a 
truck on three or four occasions to haul in rock and hardpan 
to rebuild the ditch banks (R. 481. 486-487. 521). In addi-
tion, there was testimony that the drainage ditch near the 
Averetts property would require the use of a dragline or 
backhoe to clean it out (R. 522-523). 
Finally. Averetts assert that the Drainage District 
did not need to own the land and that ownership was not criti-
cal to its operation. While it might be true that in certain 
instances an easement would be sufficient to the purposes of a 
ditch, the facts established that the Drainage District had 
acquired, by purchase, fee ownership. Ownership carries with 
it certain advantages under the law over an easement. Owner-
ship does not have the responsibility or restrictions imposed 
by the existence of a subservient estate which an easement 
does. As an example, the Court is referred to §19-4-4. Utah 
Code Annotated. as amended, where drainage districts are 
permitted entry to lands for repairs and maintenance but with 
the restriction that they do "no more damage than the neces-
sity of the occasion may require." By owning the subject 
property. Drainage District was not burdened with this re-
striction. Neither this Court, nor Averetts. should substi-
tute their judgment for that of the Drainage District as to 
what is reasonable or necessary. 
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POINT II 
AVERETTS DID NOT ESTABLISH BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE 
EVIDENCE THAT THEY ADVERSELY POSSESSED THE DRAINAGE 
DISTRICT'S PROPERTY 
If. contrary to the facts and arguments of Point I. 
the Court determines that the Averetts are entitled to ad-
versely possess the property of the Drainage District. 
Averetts failed to establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence all of the facts necessary to support their claim of 
adverse possession of the Drainage District's property. 
The Averetts' claim of adverse possession of the 
Drainage District's property is not founded upon a written 
instrument. As such, it is governed by the provisions of 
S78-12-T0 ^ through §78-12-12. Those sections set forth certain 
requirements in order to establish a claim of adverse posses-
sion. The basic requirements of the sections are that for a 
period of seven years the party claiming adverse possession: 
(1) must be in actual occupation of the property. (2) exclusve 
of any other right. (3) adverse to the right of the owner. (4) 
continuously, and (5) have paid the taxes. 
Specific requirements to be used in determining what 
land is deemed to be possessed and occupied for purposes of 
§78-12-10 are contained in §78-12-11. Said section provides 
that in order for land to be deemed to be possessed and oc-
cupied by a person claiming it by adverse possession, the 
property must (1) have been protected by a substantial in-
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closure, (2) have been usually cultivated or improved, or (3) 
money or labor have been expended for dams, canals, etc. for 
the purpose of irrigating the properties. These provisions 
have been established for the purpose of providing reasonable 
notice to the owner of the property that his property is being 
adversely possessed. This was explained in Hammond v. 
Johnson, wherein the Court stated at page 898-9 as follows: 
To constitute 'adverse possession1 the 
possession must be actual, for otherwise 
there is no disseisin, and the real owner 
remains in possession, actually or con-
structively. It must be continuous, for 
upon its cessation or interruption the 
possession, in contemplation of law. is 
again in the holder of the legal title. It 
must be hostile to the real owner, and with 
the intention to claim the land adversely 
to him. This claim must be manifest from 
the nature or circumstances of the posses-
sion, so that the owner may be informed of 
it. and that he shall not be misled into 
acquiescence in what he might reasonably 
suppose to be a mere trespass when he would 
not have acquiesced in the assertion of a 
right adverse to his own title. 
It was the contention of the Drainage District at 
trial and the trial court so found that the Averetts' had 
I I 
failed to establish by a preponderance 6t the evidence the 
requisite elements of adverse possession. Averetts challenge 
certain of the trial court's Findings of Fact as erroneous. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to disturb 
the findings of the trial court. In Bennion v. Hansen, 699 
P.2d 757 (Utah. 1985). it was held as follows: "On appeal the 
findings of the trial court will not be disturbed unless there 
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is no substantial record evidence to support them. In review-
ing the evidence we view it in the light most favorable to the 
trial court." Recently, the Supreme Court in Scharf v. BMG 
Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah. 1985). set forth the manner in 
which a party must prove that there is no substantial evidence 
to support Findings of Fact. The Court states therein at page 
1070: 
To mount a successful attack on the trial 
court's findings of fact, an appellant must 
marshal all the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings and then demonstrate 
that even viewing it in the light most 
favorable to the court below, the evidence 
is insufficient to support the finding. 
[Citations omitted]. 
As in the Scharf case above. Averetts have cited 
various parts of the record which favor their version of the 
case. Averetts have failed to marshall the evidence in support 
of the trial court's findings, to view it in the light most 
favorable to the trial court and then show that it is insuffi-
cient to support the finding. Having failed to satisfy the 
requirements of Scharf. this Court should refuse to overturn 
any of the Findings of Fact of the trial court. 
The Court is nonetheless referred to the following 
parts of the record which show that the Findings of Fact are 
supported by substantial evidence. Findings of Fact Nos. 19 
and 20 are as follows: 
19. Plaintiffs have improved a portion of 
the subject property by the construction of 
a silage pit. Plaintiffs have failed to 
establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence the size of such silage pit and the 
extent to which it lies on the subject 
property. 
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20. Plaintiffs have protected by a sub-
stantial inclosure a portion of the subject 
property contained within the
 (qorral 
fence. Plaintiffs have failed to establish 
by a preponderance of the evidence the size 
of such corral and the extent to which such 
corral encloses the subject property. 
There was testimony from Mr. Averett that he built a 
corral in the southeast corner of his property by connecting 
onto the Robertson fence on the South and the railroad fence 
on the East. The testimony was conflicting as to whether the 
corral was 100 feet by 200 feet, 40 feet by 100 feet or (R. 
317, 319, 363). Within said corral area, Averetts built a 
shed and had built a silage pit. There was conflicting evi-
dence as to the size of the silage pit: 40 x 100 (R. 321), 25 
X 100 (R. 527) to 20 X 50 (R. 532). 
Other than testimony that the shed and silage pit 
were in the corraJL and that the silage pit was "along the edge 
of the ditch" (R. 321). the only evidence of the location of 
said improvements was Mr. Averett*s sketch in Exhibit 10. 
Because of the irregular edge to the drainage ditch, this 
location is crucial in determining how much of the subject 
property was inclosed or improved by the corral and silage 
pit. Due to these deficiencies in the evidence and the proof 
by Averetts. Averetts failed to establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence how much of the subject property was contained 
within said corrals and fence or the extent to which the 
silage pit lies on the subject property. Findings of Fact 
Nos. 19 and 20 are supported by substantial evidence. 
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Finding of Fact No. 21 is as follows: 
21. The fence on the east of the subject 
property was constructed by the railroad. 
The fence on the north of the property was 
constructed by a Mr. Forbush. 
Mr. Averett acknowledged that the fences on the north and on 
the east of the subject property were in existence at the time 
he purchased the property (R. 307). The fence on the east was 
constructed by the railroad (R. 322, 525, 534). Although Mr. 
Averett asserted that he had rebuilt a portion of the Forbush 
fence (R. 353), a portion of Mr. Averett1s deposition was 
admitted into court in which he stated that he did not con-
struct the Forbush fence (R. 357-358). Finding of Fact No. 21 
is also supported by substantial evidence. 
There was likewise substantial evidence to support 
Findings of Fact No. 22 and 23, which are as follows: 
22. Plaintiffs did not adequately maintain 
the fence on the east of the subject pro-
perty nor the fence on the north of the 
subject property to the extent that animals 
were adequately confined or retained within 
the fences and as such the fences were not 
a substantial inclosure. 
23. Plaintiffs have failed to establish by 
a preponderance of the evidence that they 
have protected the subject property by a 
substantial inclosure. 
Mr. Averett claimed that he maintained the fences when neces-
sary. "We don't go around fixing gaps. If the cow gets out, 
we find out where the cow gets out and go fix it." (R. 322, 
357). Mr. Averett acknowledged that the fence on the north 
was "in less than a desirable condition" (R. 308). Mr. Arthur 
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Boyer and Mr. Raphel Palfreyman stated that the fence on the 
east was maintained by the railroad and that he never saw Mr. 
Averett or anybody else maintain the north fence (R. 491, 
525). Mr. Palfreyman stated that the fence on the East wasn't 
much of a fence, that the fence on the North was down most of 
the time, and that cattle were passing back and forth through 
it (R. 524-528). There was other testimony that cattle got 
through the fence and that the fences were not adequate to 
contain them (Exhibits 28 and 30). 
The first sentence of Finding of Fact No. 24 states 
as follows: 
24. Any possession of the subject property 
by the plaintiffs was not exclusive in that 
other persons, including particularly the 
agents and employees of the defendant made 
use of the subject property. 
Averetts do not assert any error in Finding of Fact No. 24. 
Instead, Averetts rely upon case law outside the State of Utah 
to the effect that one can have exclusive possession for 
purposes of adverse possession despite the existence of pri-
vate easements. Averetts have cited no Utah cases holding 
possession to be exclusive despite the existence of a private 
easement. Averetts do refer the Court to Kouri v. Burnett, 
415 P.2d 963 (Okl. 1966), and to Stark v. Stanhope, 206 Kan. 
428, 480 P.2d 72 (1971). Both cases are distinguishable from 
the instant case. 
In Kouri v. Burnett, Burnett sought to quiet title to 
certain property and Kouri resisted on the basis that he had 
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used the property as an easement to other property. Kouri did 
not claim to be the owner of the property. The Court there 
permitted the adverse possession by Burnett despite the use of 
the easement by Kouri. The Court then cited with approval the 
following: 
Possession may be exclusive notwithstanding 
the land is subject to rights which are 
mere easements and not things in posses-
sion. 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession, p. 568. 
§51; Barker v. Publishers1 Paper Co.. et 
al. 78 N.H. 160. 97 A. 749. 
Likewise, in Stark v. Stanhope, the Court permitted 
the adverse possession of certain property despite evidence of 
public use of a roadway. The Court there cited 3 Ara.Jur.2d 
Adverse Possession. §53. p. 143. as follows: 
As a general rule, any use of premises by 
the public which indicates a claim of 
common or public right will prevent the 
acquisition of title by adverse possession 
of the premises by any person; in such a 
case, the possession is not exclusive. The 
rule is held not to apply, however, where 
the use and occupation by the claimant and 
the public are not common uses. The per-
missive use of land by the public does not 
affect the acquisition of title by adverse 
possession, since such a use acknowledges 
the possession of the person holding the 
land, and is subordinate thereto. The same 
is true of casual use by the public. 
(Emphasis supplied). Id., at 77 
The Court in Stark went on to state as follows: 
We are of the opinion the infrequent pass-
ing of the public on the roadway amounted 
to nothing more than mere casual entries on 
the land made without any intention of 
asserting a right of entry and possession, 
and was not sufficient to break the con-
tinuity of the appellants1 exclusive pos-
session and use of the remainder of the 
tract. Id. at 78 
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In both cases, the party trying to defeat the claim 
of adverse possession merely had an easement across the pro-
perty. In the instant case, the Drainage District did not 
merely have an easement or, as described by Averetts, "a 
statutory right to enter the property". Since 1934 it was the 
fee owner of the subject property. Furthermore, the Drainage 
District's use of the subject property could not be described 
as "casual use by the public". 
During the entire time of Averetts ownership of the 
property. Drainage District maintained the ditches on the 
subject property. Arthur Boyer testified that he examined and 
maintained the drains at least once or twice a week and had to 
haul rocks and hardpan in to fix the ditch banks (R. 470, 
487-488, 520). Raphel Palfreyman also regularly examined and 
maintained the ditch (R. 485-459. 519). Drainage District 
personnel never asked Averetts for permission to enter the 
property but entered upon their owned property (R. 489). 
Averetts never disputed the use of the subject property as a 
drainage ditch, nor prevented the access to or use of it by 
the Drainage District personnel (R. 321, 489). 
As noted in Hammond v. Johnson, any interruption in 
possession will serve to defeat a claim of adverse posses-
sion. As noted above. Drainage District regularly went onto 
the subject property to maintain the ditch and did so without 
seeking or receiving permission from Averetts. This interrup-
tion in possession serves to defeat Averetts1 claim of adverse 
possession. 
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The second sentence of Finding of Fact No. 24 states: 
Further, any possession of the subject 
property by plaintiffs was not of suffi-
ciently open, notorious, hostile and ad-
verse nature as to bring such possession to 
the Knowledge of the agents and employees 
of defendant. 
Averetts do not claim any error in such finding either. As 
previously noted, there was no testimony of any time in which 
Averetts objected to or restricted the access of the agents of 
the Drainage District to the subject property, nor to any use 
or maintenance of the ditch. The only evidence presented by 
Averetts of the exclusive possession of the subject property 
was the posting of no trespassing or hunting by permission 
signs. However, when he was asked about keeping others off 
the property. Mr. Averett answered as follows: 
MR. AVERETT: To my knowledge, there was 
always a "NO TRESPASS" sign on the gate 
entrance. And during the hunting season my 
boys would put "NO TRESPASS" sigps all the 
way around the perimeter of our property. 
Q: Trespass or "NO TRESPASS" signs? 
A: "NO TRESPASS." They were either "NO 
TRESPASS" or "HUNTING BY PERMISSION." 
Q: During your occupancy of the property 
from 1968 until 1983. or late '83, did you 
keep others off the property near the drain 
ditch area? 
A: No sir. I did not. On one occasion I 
told a Mr. Ball--he came on there and asked 
for permission to fish, and one of my older 
boys was standing there on the other side 
of the bank and he hollered. "Hey. kid. get 
out of there. You're scaring my fish." 
And I said. "Mr. Ball, you111 have to 
leave." and he left. 
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Q: I think you misunderstood my question. 
Did you allow other peQjple on the property? 
A: On occasions, we have had trappers and 
fishermen come and ask for permission if 
they could trap the area or qo fishinq in 
there, and 1 qave them permission. 
Q: Did anybody ever enter onto the pro-
perty without your permission? 
A: I'm sure they did. 
Q: When you weren't there? 
A: Yes. 
Q: When you were there, what did you do? 
A: I really didn't do anythinq. If I saw 
somebody qoinq down the ditch. I didn't run 
over there and holler. "Hey. quy. qet out 
of here." I would just let them qo. Some 
people would ask. and some people didn't. 
(Emphasis added) (R. 336:12-25. 337:1-17) 
The existence of the railroad fence on the East and 
the Forbush fence on the North, as well as the maintenance, or 
rather lack thereof by Averetts. of such fences did not serve 
to put Drainaqe District on notice of a claim of adverse 
possession by Averetts. It should be noted that the sub-
stantial inclosure provision under the Idaho adverse posses-
sion statute, which is similar to §78-12-|ll. Utah Code Anno-
tated, as amended, and is included in the appendix, has been 
interpreted to require that the fence be built by the adverse 
claimant. See Standall v. Teater. 96 Id, 152. 525 P.2d 347 
(1974). and Loomis v. Union Pacific Railr oad Company. 97 Id. 
341. 544 P.2d 299 (1975). The apparent rteasoninq behind such 
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interpretation is that if the fences are not constructed by 
the adverse claimant, there is nothing by such ••inclosure" to 
give the party against whom such adverse possession is claimed 
notice that his property is being adversely possessed. 
The Court is also referred to 3 Am.Jur.2d. Adverse 
Possession §36. which states as follows: 
Where inclosure is essential or is relied 
on as the evidence of possession, it must, 
to be effective, be complete and so open 
and notorious as to charge the owner with 
knowledge thereof. The question in such 
case is whether the inclosure. like other 
acts of possession, is sufficient 'fly the 
flag1 over the land and put the true owner 
on notice that the property is held under 
an adverse claim of ownership. 
In Scott v. Hansen. 18 Utah 2d 303. 422 P.2d 525 
(1966). the Court reiterated the same principles described 
above as well as in Hammond: 
The pivotal consideration here is that 
there must be some actual occupation of the 
property of such character or under such 
circumstances that the owner knows, or as a 
man or ordinary prudence should know, that 
the land was being held as his own by the 
adverse claimant. Ld. at 307-308 
It cannot be said that the possession by Averetts was 
consistent with these principles. Averetts did not construct 
the fences which around the subject property and failed to 
adequately maintain them. Averetts never prevented or re-
stricted the access of the agents of Drainage District or. for 
that matter, any other person. The sole evidence of Averetts1 
possession was the existence of a No Trespassing sign on the 
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gate, which the agents of Drainage District ignored, and 
similar signs during the hunting season. The trial court 
correctly found that such possession was frot of such a charac-
ter as to apprise the Drainage District that its property was 
being adversely possessed by Averetts. Averetts have failed 
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence all of the 
necessary elements to adversely possess the subject property. 
The trial court also found that the Averetts did not 
hav$i actual knowledge of the ownership tyy Drainage District, 
although they perhaps should have had sucjh knowledge, but did 
have constructive knowledge of such ownership by virtue of 
Averetts1 deed and the recording statute (Finding of Fact No. 
9, H. 214). The North Carolina Court of appeals in Williamson 
V. Vann. 42 N.C.App. 569, 257 S.E.2d 102, 103-104 (1979), 
stated: "The unintentional possession of a tract of land or 
possession under the mistaken belief that it was embraced 
within the conveyance to the possessor will not constitute 
adverse possession. [Citations omitted]" 
This is supported by the Utah case of Home Owners1 
Loan Corporation v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 141 P.2d 160 (1943), 
where the Court stated at page 227: 
Mrs. Beckstead did not testify to any 
possession on her part or 6n the part of 
her husband being adverse. £he stated that 
at the time of the construction of the new 
home they did not know an^ other person 
claimed title to it, and that she did not 
hear that any other person claimed title to 
it until a short time before they moved 
away. . . . In fact, there is lacking any 
positive testimony that the possession of 
-33-
the Becksteads was adverse or that their 
encroachment onto Tract A by building a 
house or by any other acts was the result 
of anything but an honest mistake in judg-
ment as to boundary line of Tract B. 
Since Averetts claim they did not know of the owner-
ship of the subject property by the Drainage District, it 
cannot be said that Averetts intended to or did possess the 
subject property adversely to the interest of the Drainage 
District. 
While it is true that the Averetts paid all taxes 
assessed by Utah County, which assessments included the Drain-
age District property, any such assessments against the Drain-
age District property were unlawful. As a municipal organiza-
tion. Drainage District and its assets are not subject to 
taxation. Averetts are not entitled to any additional benefit 
under the adverse possession statute by reason of their pay-
ment of such unlawful taxes. 
CONCLUSION 
The Drainage District is the owner of the two acres 
comprising the subject property and has been since 1934. The 
Drainage District constructed, used and maintained a drainage 
ditch on the subject property since 1920. The use of the 
subject property by the Drainage District constitutes a public 
use and benefit. The trial court found that all of the sub-
ject property was reasonably necessary for the public use of 
-34-
the Drainage District. Under the statutes and cases of the 
State of Utah, such public property may not be adversely 
possessed. 
Even if the Court were to determine that some of the 
subject property was not public property, the trial court 
found that Averetts had failed to establish by a preponderance 
of the evidence their adverse possession of the subject pro-
perty as against the claim of the Drainage District. There is 
substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings of 
fact. The Court is respectfully requested to affirm the 
decision of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of April. 1987. 
Alc^Q [1A? 
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43 East 200 North 
P. O. Box "L" 
Provo. Utah 84603 
Attorneys for Appellants 
M. Byron Fisher. Esq. 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Attorney for Intervenor 
800 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101 
Secretary 
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APPENDIX 
DAVID D. JEFFS 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
Attorneys at Law. P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
90 North 100 East 
P. O. Box 683 
Provo. Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM AVERETT and 
MARIE A. AVERETT. 
Plaintiffs. FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
UTAH COUNTY DRAINAGE DISTRICT 
NO. 1. a corporation. 
Defendant. 
INTERMOUNTAIN POWER AGENCY. Civil No. 65.070 
Intervenor. 
/ 
This matter came on duly and regularly to be heard on 
the 17th day of July. 1985. before the honorable George E. 
Ballif. Judge, sitting without a jury upofr the Complaint of 
plaintiff and the Counterclaim of defendant. The plaintiffs 
were present in Court and represented by th^ir attorney. Allen 
K. Young. The defendant was present in Co^ irt and represented 
by its attorney. David D. Jeffs. The Coujflt having heard the 
evidence and arguments of counsel, and beirkg fully advised in 
the premises, now makes and enters the following: 
FEB 6 1986 
<^(L> „D 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Utah County Drainage District No. 1 (herein-
after defendant) was organized on November 4, 1918 as a drain-
age district under Title XIX and has existed since that date. 
The District as such is a municipal corporation. 
2. During the years of 1919 through 1920, 
defendant commenced and completed construction of an open 
drainage district on the subject property. 
3. On the 31st day of July, 1934, a deed from 
Chillian F. and Phoebe S. Packard was executed to Utah County 
Drainage District No. 1 which deed was recorded on April 3. 
1935 as Entry No. 3091. Book 316, Page 50, on the Records of 
the Utah County Recorder. 
4. The above described deed conveyed to defen-
dant the property which is the subject matter of this dispute 
(herein subject property) and which is more particularly 
described as follows: 
DP 408-ALSO BEGINNING at a point 1209• 
South 0°30* West and 385.44 feet North 
88°30' West from the Northeast corner of 
Section 31, Township 7 South, Range 3 East, 
Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence North 
0°30l East 732 feet; thence North 88o304 
West 1287 feet; thence West 0°30l East 480 
feet; thence North 88°30l West 66 feet; 
thence South 0°30l West 515 feet; thence 
South 66°30' East 660 feet; thence South 
0°30l West 27 feet; thence South 88°20l 
East 627 feet; thence South 0°30l West 627 
feet; thence South 88°30< East 66 feet, to 
point of beginning containing 3.32 acres 
more or less. 
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5. The above described deed further conveyed to 
defendant a strip of land approximately 66 feet wide which ran 
generally north and west of the subject property to Utah Lake. 
6. There is no evidence of the grant of an 
easement to defendant for construction of the open drainage 
ditch prior to the above described deed. The evidence fails 
to establish that defendant had acquired a prescriptive ease-
ment prior to delivery of the deed to defen4ant in 1934. 
7. On the 30th day of April. 1968, Joseph C. 
Williamson and Naida R. Williamson conveyed a certain parcel 
of property encompassing the subject property to plaintiff, 
Marie A. Averett. Said deed was recorded May 1, 1968 as Entry 
No. 4291, Book 1109, Page 365 on the records of Utah County. 
8. The said deed from Joseph C Williamson and 
Naida R. Williamson to Marie A. Averett contained the follow-
ing exclusion: 
LESS that portion of the above described 
property sold to Utah County Drainage 
District No. 1, a corporation by Warranty 
Deed dated July 31, 1934, executed by 
Chillian F. Packard and Phoefye S. Packard, 
his wife, recorded April 3, }-935, as Entry 
No. 3091, in Book 316, Page io, records of 
Utah County, Utah. 
9. The plaintiffs did not have actual knowledge 
of the ownership by defendant of the 66 foot wide strip of 
land including the subject property. Plaintiffs had construc-
tive notice by the recording statute and the deed to their 
property of the ownership by defendant of the subject property. 
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10. There is no evidence that the officers and 
agents of the defendant who are alive had actual knowledge of 
the ownership of the subject property, although the recitation 
of $100.00 consideration for the deed to the defendant in 1934 
is evidence that prior officers and agents may have known of 
said ownership. 
11. Since completion of the open drainage ditch 
in 1920, defendant has owned, used and maintained the open 
drainage ditch on the subject property. 
12. Defendant has not intended to abandon nor 
has it abandoned any of the subject property. Defendant has 
not sold nor has it intended to sell any of the subject pro-
perty prior to the time that Intermountain Power Association 
sought condemnation of the subject property. 
13. The entire subject property was reasonably 
necessary for the use and maintenance of defendant's open 
drainage ditch. 
14. Utah County has not levied or assessed any 
real property taxes against the real property of defendant. 
15. Plaintiffs have paid all taxes which were 
levied and assessed against their property which adjoins the 
subject property. Said tax assessments included the subject 
property of the defendant. 
16. Since defendant is a municipal corporation, 
its property is exempt from taxation. Any taxes levied and 
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assessed against its property, wheter assessed in the name of 
plaintiffs or otherwise, were unlawful. 
17. Plaintiffs have not paid any amounts for 
dams, canals, embankments, aqueducts or otherwise for the 
purpose of irrigating the subject property amounting to the 
sum of $5 per acre. 
18. Plaintiffs have not usually cultivated the 
subject property. 
19. Plaintiffs have improved a portion of the 
subject property by the construction of a sileage pit. Plain-
tiffs have failed to establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence the size of such such sileage pit and the extent to 
which it lies on the subject property. 
20. Plaintiffs have protected by a substantial 
inclosure a portion of the subject property contained within 
the corral fence. Plaintiffs have failed to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence the size of ^uch corral and the 
extent to which such corral encloses the subject property. 
21. The fence on the east of the subject pro-
perty was constructed by the railroad. The fence on the north 
of the property was constructed by a Mr. For^ush. 
22. Plaintiffs did not adequately maintain the 
fence on the east of the subject property n6r the fence on the 
north of the subject property to the extentf that aniraal6 were 
adequately confined or retained within the fences and as such 
the fences were not a substantial inclosure. 
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23. Plaintiffs have failed to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that they have protected the 
subject property by a substantial inclosure. 
24. Any possession of the subject property by 
the plaintiffs was not exclusive in that other persons, in-
cluding particularly the agents and employees of the defendant 
made use of the subject property. Further, any possession of 
the subject property by plaintiffs was not of sufficiently 
open, notorious, hostile and adverse nature as to bring such 
possession to the knowledge of the agents and employees of 
defendant. 
25. Plaintiffs have failed to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence all of the elements necessary to 
permit them to adversely possess the subject property. 
26. Defendant assessed plaintiffs a drainage 
district assessment for the subject property in the amount of 
$1.00 or $1.50 per year for the years 1977 to 1983. 
27. Any assessment by defendant is of such a 
minimal nature that defendant would not be estopped thereby to 
claim the subject property. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
now makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiffs may not adversely possess the 
property of defendant held for public use. 
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2. All of the subject property constitutes 
property held for a public use by defendant^ 
3. Defendant has not abandoned or otherwise 
given up any claim to the subject property, 
4. Defendant is not estopped to assert its 
rights to the subject property. 
5. Plaintiffs have not established by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence their claim to t^ he subject property 
by adverse possession. Plaintiffs' Complaint is dismissed, no 
cause of action. 
6. Defendant is entitled to have the title to 
the subject property quieted to it free ahd clear of any and 
all claims of the plaintiffs by adverse possession or other-
wise. The subject property is more particularly described as 
follows: 
DP 408-ALSO BEGINNING at ^ point 1209* 
South 0°30l West and 385.4(4 feet North 
88°30l West from the Northeast corner of 
Section 31. Township 7 South. Range 3 East. 
Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence North 
0°30« East 732 feet; thence North 88°30l 
West 1287 feet; thence West 0°30< East 480 
feet; thence North 88°30l *|test 66 feet; 
thence South 0o30' West 515 feet; thence 
South 66°30' East 660 feet; thence South 
0°30' West 27 feet; thence South 88°20' 
East 627 feet; thence South 6°30< West 627 
feet; thence South 88o30l Eadt 66 feet, to 
point of beginning containing 3.32 acres 
more or less. 
7. Defendant is entitled to all funds tendered 
by Intermountain Power Agency. 
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Dated and signed this Cz> day of /^e^o^CO-g'^ J.985. 
BY THE COURT: 
George EZ Ballif. Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that the original of the foregoing 
was mailed to the Clerk of the Court. Utah County. P. O. Box 
49. Provo. Utah 84603. and a copy to the below named parties 
by placing sarae in the United States mails, postage prepaid. 
this 26th day of July. 1985. addressed as follows: 
Allen K. Young. Esq. 
Young. Harris & Carter 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
350 East Center 
Provo. Utah 84601 
M. Byron Fisher. Esq. 
Fabian & Clendenin 
Attorneys for Intermountain Power Agency 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101 
£cvu^ Cky 
Secretary 
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DAVID D. JEFFS 
JEFFS AND JEFFS 
Attorneys at Law. P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
90 North 100 East 
P. O. Box 683 
Provo. Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM AVERETT and 
MARIE A. AVERETT. 
P l a i n t i f f s . J U D G M E N T 
v s . 
UTAH COUNTY DRAINAGE DISTRICT 
NO. 1. a corporation. 
Defendant. 
INTERMOUNTAIN POWER AGENCY. Civil No. 65.070 
Intervenor. 
/ 
This matter came on duly and regularly to be heard on 
the 17th day of July. 1985. before the Honorable George E. 
Ballif. Judge, sitting without a jury upon the Complaint of 
plaintiff and the Counterclaim of defendant. The plaintiffs 
were present in Court and represented by t^ ieir attorney. Allen 
K. Young. The defendant was present in Court and represented 
by its attorney. David D. Jeffs. The Court having heard the 
evidence and arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in 
the premises, and having heretofore submitted its Findings of 
JFB 6 m 
Fact and Conclusions of Law# now makes and enters the fo l low-
i n g : 
J U D G M E N T 
1. Plaintiffs1 Complaint for adverse possession 
of the following described real property is dismissed, no 
cause of action. 
2. Defendant is quieted title in and to the 
following described real property free and clear of any claim 
of plaintiffs by adverse possession or otherwise: 
DP 408-ALSO BEGINNING at a point 1209• 
South 0°30l West and 385.44 feet North 
88°30' West from the Northeast corner of 
Section 31, Township 7 South. Range 3 East. 
Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence North 
0°30» East 732 feet; thence North 88°30' 
West 1287 feet; thence West 0°30l East 480 
feet; thence North 88°30' West 66 feet; 
thence South 0°30! West 515 feet; thence 
South 66°30l East 660 feet; thence South 
0o30' West 27 feet; thence South 88°20' 
East 627 feet; thence South 0°30l West 627 
feet; thence South 88°30< East 66 feet, to 
point of beginning containing 3.32 acres 
more or less. 
3. Defendant is awarded all funds tendered by 
Intermountain Power Agency. 
Dated and signed this £? day of fs^/5rj,{/_.^t^^1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
George 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that the original of the foregoing 
was mailed to the Clerk of the Court. Uta^ i County. P. O. Box 
49. Provo. Utah 84603. and a copy to the below named parties 
by placing same in the United States mails, postage prepaid. 
this 26th day of July. 1985. addressed as fallows: 
Allen K. Young. Esq. 
Young. Harris & Carter 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
350 East Center 
Provo. Utah 84601 
M. Byron Fisher. Esq. 
Fabian & Clendenin 
Attorneys for Intermountain P^wer Agency 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101 
ffiu/ML &$, 
Secretary 
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UTAH STATUTES 
78-12-10. Under claim not founded on written instrument or judgment. 
—Where it appears that there has been an actual continued occupation 
of laud under claim of title, exclusive of any other right, but not founded 
upon a written instrument, judgment or decree, the land so actually 
occupied, and no other, is deemed to have been held adversely. 
78-12-11. What constitutes adverse possession not under written instru-
ment.—For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by a person 
claiming title, not founded upon a written instrument, judgment or 
decree land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following 
cases only: 
(1) Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure. 
(2) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
(3) Where labor or money has been expended upon dams, canals; 
embankments, aqueducts or otherwise for the purpose of i<rip:ating such, 
lands amounting to the sum of $5 per acre. 
78-12-12. Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid.—In no case 
shall adverse possession be considered established under th^ provisions of 
any section of this code, unless it shall be 6hown that the land has been 
occupied and claimed for the period of seven years continuously, and that 
the party, his predecessors and grantors have paid all t a x p which have 
been levied and assessed upon such land according to law. 
78-12-13. Adverse possession of public streets or ways.—No person 
6hall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or to any lands held by 
any town, city or county, or the corporate authorities thereof, designated 
for public use as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares, 
or for any other public purpose, by adverse possession thereof for any 
length of time whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively appear that such 
town or city or county or the corporate authorities thereof have sold, or 
otherwise disposed of, and conveyed such real estate to k purchaser for 
a valuable consideration, and that for more than seven years subsequent 
to such conveyance the purchaser, his grantees or successors in interest, 
have been in the exclusive, continuous and adverse possession of such real 
estate; in which case an adverse title may be acquired. 
19-4-4. Public uses—Right of entry on lands—Prohibitions.—The use 
of any canal, ditch, or the like, created under the provisions of this act, 
shall be deemed a public use and for a public benefit. The supervisors or 
their representatives from the time of their appointment may go upon the 
lands lying within said district for the purpose of examining the same, and 
making surveys, and after the organization of said district and payment 
or tender of compensation allowed, may go upon said lands with their 
servants, teams, tools, instruments, or other equipment, for the purpose of 
constructing such proposed work, and may forever thereafter enter upon 
said lands, as aforesaid, for the purpose of maintaining or repairing such 
proposed work, doing no more damage than the necessity of the occasion 
may require, any person or persons who shall willfully prevent or prohibit 
any of such persons from entering such lands for the purposes aforesaid 
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction be fined any 
sum not exceeding $25 per day for each day's hindrance, which sum shall 
be paid into the county treasury for the use of said district. 
IDAHO STATUTES 
5-210. Oral claim—Possession defined—Payment of taxes* — For the 
purpose of constituting an adverse possession, by a person claiming title not 
founded upon a written instrument, judgment or decree, land is deemed to 
have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only: 
1, Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure. 
2. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
Provided, however, that in no case shall adverse possession be considered 
established under the provisions of any sections of this code unless it shall 
be shown that the land has been occupied and claimed for the period of five 
(5) years continuously, and the party or persons, their predecessors and 
grantors, have paid all the taxes, state, county or municipal, which have 
been levied and assessed upon such land according to law. [C.C.P. 1881, 
§ 160; RS„ R.C., & CX., § 4043; C.S., § 6603; I.C.A., § 6-210] 
